Impending environmental crises are often ignored until some highly visible event triggers public concern.  A fire on the highly polluted Cuyahoga River in 1969 led to action on water pollution.  Similarly, the rupture of the Exxon Valdez in 1989 led to tougher standards on oil tankers. So what will it take to energize public concern about water scarcity? 

Last week, researchers at San Diego's Scripps Institution of Oceanography caught public attention when they projected that due to drought conditions and the demands of population growth there was a 50/50 chance that Lake Mead would run dry by 2021.  Right now, Lake Mead is at about 50 percent capacity.  The researchers indicated that if current allocations of water persist, there's a 50 percent chance that by 2023 Lake Mead won't provide water without pumping, and a 10 percent chance that it won't by 2013.  Perhaps even more shocking, they reported that there's a 50 percent chance that the Hoover Dam won't be able to generate hydroelectric power by 2017.

The potential loss of the Hoover Dam, which meets the electrical needs of more than a million households, should ring some alarm bells.  An article in last week’s Science News, reported that:

Besides providing water for millions, flow from Lake Mead—the reservoir formed as the Colorado River collects behind Hoover Dam—generates prodigious amounts of hydroelectric power. Over the past century, on average, about 18.5 cubic kilometers of water flowed into Lake Mead each year, says Tim P. Barnett, a climatologist at the Scripps Institution of Oceanography in La Jolla, Calif. Of that amount, about 2.1 km3 evaporate into the dry desert air or soak into the ground beneath the lake each year. What's left in the lake is more than spoken for: The amount of water drawn from Lake Mead this year to meet demand in cities as far-flung as Los Angeles and San Diego will exceed 16.6 km3.

And the situation will likely get worse, Barnett and colleague David W. Pierce speculate in an upcoming Water Resources Research. By 2030, the researchers note, annual demand for Lake Mead's water is projected to rise to 17.4 km3. Also, some climate studies suggest that the Colorado's flow will drop between 10 and 30 percent in the next 30 to 50 years. Using these data, as well as weather simulations that impose random but reasonable annual variations in river flow volume, Barnett and Pierce used a computer model to estimate the remaining useful life of the Lake Mead reservoir.

The same article quoted Barnett as saying "We were stunned at the magnitude of the problem and how fast it was coming at us.”  Barnett was not alone in his concern:

Results of the new study are "fairly provocative, an eye-opener," says Connie Woodhouse, a climatologist at the University of Arizona in Tucson. Using estimates of river flow based on an average of the past century may be optimistic, she adds, because tree ring–based reconstructions of the region's climate suggest that the 20th century was one of the wettest in the past 500 years. "The more we learn about the Colorado River and its hydrology, the more worried we need to be," says Peter H. Gleick, a hydrologist at the Pacific Institute in Oakland, Calif.

Food security is not an issue in the U.S. Presidential debates.  Not yet anyway.  But if the candidates were scrambling for votes in places like China, Jordan, Mexico, Morocco, or Afghanistan, it might be a different story.  In the past year, food prices have soared worldwide.  Prices for corn, wheat and soybeans have more than doubled. In many parts of the world, prices of basic food staples have gone up by 40 percent in the past few months alone.

For most Americans, the impact of rising food prices has not between catastrophic. Grain commodity prices account for only a fraction of the American food bill. Over the past twelve months, U.S. food prices rose less than 5 percent.

But elsewhere in the world many people are highly dependent on wheat and other grains, particularly those living on $2 a day or less.  For many of them the impact is devastating.

The New York Times today has a front page story (“Rising Inflation Creates Unease in Middle East”) that suggests that rising food prices are politically destabilizing.  Here’s what it had to say:

Here in Jordan, the cost of maintaining fuel subsidies amid the surge in prices forced the government to remove almost all the subsidies this month, sending the price of some fuels up 76 percent overnight. In a devastating domino effect, the cost of basic foods like eggs, potatoes and cucumbers doubled or more.

In Saudia Arabia, where inflation had been virtually zero for a decade, it recently reached an official level of 6.5 percent, though unofficial estimates put it much higher. Public protests and boycotts have followed, and 19 prominent clerics posted an unusual statement on the Internet in December warning of a crisis that would cause “theft, cheating, armed robbery and resentment between rich and poor.”

In Syria, where oil production is drying up, prices have also risen sharply. Although it has begun to liberalize its rigid socialist economy, the government has repeatedly put off plans to eliminate the subsidies that keep prices artificially low for its citizens, fearing domestic reprisals.

This weekend, Josette Sheeran, the director of the UN's World Food Programme, told the BBC that it is considering plans to ration food aid because of rising prices and a shortage of funds.

"We're also seeing some new growing needs in some places like Afghanistan, where people are being thrown into food insecurity just simply due to the higher food prices."

She said those who had been hardest hit so far were people in developing countries who were living on 50 US cents (£0.25) a day, 80-90% of which was already being spent on food.

"In some of these developing countries, prices have gone up 80% for staple food," she added. "When you see those kinds of increases, they are simply priced out of the food markets."

Even middle-class, urban people in countries such as Indonesia, Yemen and Mexico were increasingly being priced out of the food market or forced to sacrifice education and healthcare, she warned.

Ms Sheeran said Egypt had just widened its food rationing system after two decades and Pakistan had reintroduced ration cards after many years.

As these articles suggest, several factors are driving up food prices.  Some of it is due to changing consumption patterns—increasing affluence in China, for example, is leading people to demand more grain intensive food like chicken and pork.  Some of it is due to rising energy prices, which is increasing the cost of producing and transporting food. 

Much of it, however, still comes back to the fact that rising population is boosting the world’s appetite for food, while drought and rising energy prices are making it ever more difficult for farmers to meet that demand. 

Maybe the next presidential debate should be in Morocco or Timbuktu.

During the past year, former President Bill Clinton has been warning audiences that “world's population is projected to grow from 6.5 to 9 billion people by 2050, and almost all of that growth will occur in countries least able economically to support new people.” 

The 9 billion figure used by Clinton and many others today is actually one of three projections—low, medium, and high variants--made by the United Nations. The medium variant, of course, is the one most widely used.  It assumes that the total fertility rate (TFR), the average number of children per woman, will drop from today’s rate of 2.7 to 2.0 by 2050. 

But how reliable is that assumption? Fertility rates have declined sharply in the past half century. Between 1950 and 1955, the average TFR was 5.0, almost twice as high as it is today.  But, as any Wall Street analyst will tell you, past trends do not always guarantee future results. 

It’s possible that fertility rates will not drop as fast as the medium variant indicates. With the decline in government and NGO support for family planning services in many developing nations, fertility rates in some areas may stabilize well above the “replacement rate.”  In other areas, fertility rates may actually increase.

One area of particular interest is India, where fertility rates have been cut in half over the past half century.  With a TFR of 3.0 and declining mortality rates, India population is projected to grow under medium variant assumptions from 1.14 billion today to 1.39 billion by 2025 and 1.75 billion by 2050.  But how reliable is that projection?

The Population Reference Bureau and the Population Foundation of India last year took a closer look at projections for India (“The Future Population of India:  A Long-Range Demographic View”).  The study looked more closely at the regional differences in fertility. Fertility is much higher in the northern states than in the southern states.  The press release noted that:

The large states of the north, the "Hindi Belt," are key to the future size of India's population. About 40 percent of Indians live in this region. Two northern states, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, with about 93 million and 188 million people, respectively, are already larger than most of the world's countries. Both states currently have a TFR of about 4.3 children per woman.

Relying on state-based data, rather than national fertility rates, the study developed two alternative scenarios.  The first scenario assumed that Indian states with a current TFR above "two children" would decrease to 2.1 and then stabilize. The second scenario assumed the TFR would decline until it reached 1.85 children per woman.

While the results of scenario “B” showed India’s projected population for 2050 (1.75 billion) to be close to the UN’s medium variant projection, scenario “A” showed India’s population rising to 1.83 billion by 2050 and 2.18 billion by the end of the century.  Which scenario is more likely?  The report noted:

Different users will have different opinions as to the appropriateness of the scenarios as they apply to each state. Some, for example, may feel Scenario A appropriate for Bihar, but not Uttar Pradesh. Over such a long period, many different events may influence population trends. States with low fertility today may become concerned about population ageing and decline and encourage more births. Such a turnaround may seem unlikely today, yet precisely this has happened in some countries of Asia which once advocated lower birth rates. Pressure on the availability of agricultural land may cause accelerated migration to urban areas and result in faster fertility decline. Perhaps, continuing son preference will act to keep fertility somewhat higher. And it may simply be that a TFR as low as 2.1 may never be reached in some states.

Population growth in Africa might also surpass expectations.  Seven years ago, the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) projected that global population would peak later in this century at about 9 billion. That report was seized upon by many to suggest that population growth was not a concern (an interpretation rejected by IIASA itself). A few months ago, IIASA revised its 2001 projections slightly upwards when it took another look at fertility trends.

Because of continued very low fertility or further fertility declines in some regions that already had low fertility, Eastern Europe and the China region are now shown by the POP research as having lower population growth than was projected in 2001. This is offset at the global level by higher anticipated population growth in sub-Saharan Africa.

Africa’s population will almost certainly more than double from its current level of around 740 million. Because of the great longer-term uncertainties surrounding the future speed of fertility decline and the possible new health crises under the very poor development conditions anticipated, the 95 percent range by the end of the century is very broad, from a low 1.1 billion to a very high 3.3 billion. The central 20 percent range is 1.9–2.2 billion by 2100. Two factors will in all likelihood keep Africa at the bottom of world development unless some trends change radically in the near future: continued very rapid population growth together with stagnant or declining educational attainment levels (partly as a consequence of rapidly increasing numbers of children), and the additional environmental and agricultural problems likely to be caused by climate change.

One key point to be taken from these and other studies is that population projections—including UN population projections--are only as good as the assumptions built into them.  Many today assume that TFRs everywhere will eventually decline to 2.1, or lower, and that global population will likely stabilize and then begin declining before the end of the 21st Century.  Perhaps.  But it’s always good to check the assumptions. And it’s important to remember that in many countries in sub-Saharan Africa and in some parts of South Asia, like Afghanistan, women who want fewer children often lack access to modern birth control methods.

Earlier this week, I wrote about rising food commodity prices and concerns that a global food crisis could be approaching as population growth and changing diets propel global demand.  Today, I have a few updates on that story. 

First, USAToday reported earlier this week that "Wheat continues to Surge Above $10 a bushel":

U.S. wheat prices continued to soar Wednesday as export demand remained robust despite record high prices, with values in the United States rising by the maximum allowed in a trading day and helping to rally corn and soybeans. Overall, wheat prices have doubled since last June at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), which owns the Chicago Board of Trade. Prices have been pushed higher by surging world demand and bad weather in some major producing nations.

The report went on to note that:

Egypt, one of the world's largest importers of wheat, bought 150,000 tons of the grain, including 25,000 tons from the United States, the world's top exporter of wheat. "That is such an important factor in the wheat market," says grains analyst Bill Nelson of A.G. Edwards, referring to the purchase by Egypt. "Egypt is being seen as a proxy for world grain buyers who are, in general, willing to buy grain even at record prices. This is evidence that day after day of record prices are not limiting demand," he says.

Meanwhile, press reports from the Middle East this week highlighted a recent Merrill Lynch story about the rising threat of agflation.  This story “Families to Suffer as Global Food Crunch Sends Prices Soaring” appeared in ArabianBusiness.com:

The cost of basic foods will continue to rise in the Middle East as demand from emerging markets drives a global agricultural commodity crunch, Merrill Lynch said on Tuesday. The investment bank said in a report that rapid economic development in countries such as China and India was driving demand for food up sharply, adding pressure to the supply chain and sending prices skyrocketing. It said economic development, combined with pollution and a lack of water for irrigation, were putting serious constraints on the amount of arable land available. “Global constraints on food production are shifting production patterns and pressuring prices,” the bank said. Merrill said agricultural inflation, or agflation, was beginning to have a substantial impact on inflation in emerging markets.

The Middle East news report noted the impact of agflation on Egypt and other Middle Eastern countries:

Merrill said Egypt’s consumer price index (CPI) for food and non-alcoholic beverages peaked above 17% for 2007, while Saudi Arabia's foodstuff and beverages CPI soared past 9%. According to the Saudi Trade Ministry, prices of food products, which account for the largest chunk of a family's spending, may rise by up to 30% in 2008 due largely to a drop in global supplies. In the UAE, costs of basic foods such as eggs and bread rose by as much as 30% in 2007, contributing to record inflation in the Emirates.

It’s worth noting, perhaps, that the population of Egypt already a major grain importer, is expected to jump from 73 million today to 118 million by 2050.  Saudi Arabia’s population is expected to grow from 28 million today to 50 million by 2050.

This year is the fortieth anniversary of Paul Erhlich’s “population bomb,” in which he warned that population growth could overtake food production and lead to global famine.  Declining fertility rates and rising agricultural productivity, however, defused the “bomb,” and led to grain surpluses, rather than grain shortages.

But is that still true?  For the past several years, grain reserves have been drawn steadily downward.  At present, world grain reserves are estimated at just 1.7 months, a level that Bill Doyle, head of PotashCorp, a Canadian-based fertilizer manufacturer, described last month as “precarious.”  He said that the world is facing a food crisis, that “is not getting nearly enough attention from global leaders.”  He went on to say, in an article that was published in the Canadian Press, that:

Countries have consistently drawn from long-held inventories to meet their food demand.  This has masked the grain deficit for many years and kept crop and food prices artificially low.  That can’t continue.

Since his company is in the business of selling fertilizer to countries like China and India, it would be easy to dismiss Doyle’s comments as self-serving alarmism.  But maybe not.

If a global food crisis was emerging, we would expect to see soaring commodity prices for wheat, corn, and soybeans.  Furthermore, we would see the value of farmland rising and the cost of key inputs, like fertilizer, increasing.  We would further expect that nations would begin taking emergency steps to protect their citizens from possible food shortages.

In fact, that’s exactly what’s happening.  In the past few months, wheat and soybean futures have reached record highs, and corn prices are approaching historical highs.  The value of farmland is increasing sharply in many parts of the world, and so is the cost of fertilizer. 

And, as for emergency steps, a story in this week’s Newsweek, reports that China is dipping into its emergency “pork reserve.”  Soaring grain prices have sharply increased the cost of feeding livestock, including pigs.  The Newsweek story reports that,

A new breed of criminal has emerged in China: "pigjackers." Soaring pork prices in the People's Republic have sent thieves roaring off with truckloads of hogs—and sometimes with smaller hauls, as was the case with the gang that was busted last year in Shenzhen trying to make off with 275 pounds of pork on a motorbike. A local newspaper valued the meat at upwards of $420, or roughly three times what a stolen motorbike might fetch in the city.

The article goes on to report:

In an effort to head off serious trouble, Beijing has tapped the country’s official “pork reserve.  That’s no joke, either; it’s the actual term for the special stash of meat the Chinese government keeps frozen in case of a sudden crunch—not unlike America’s Strategic Petroleum Reserve….And the country’s underlying agricultural shortages will only get worse…Experts predict that China, long a major exporter of corn products, will soon become a net importer—possibly this year.  When that happens, global grain prices could jump like this year’s oil market.

If, as this article suggests, global grain prices do takeoff like oil prices, it will renew concerns about global food security.  In the rush for grain, countries—like China—that have large “sovereign funds,” will gain access to the food they need.  And so will the United States and other developed nations, but what about the rest of the grain-importing world?  Already, record-high food prices have led to protests and rioting in many developing countries. 

After U.S. corn producers began selling more of their crops to ethanol producers last year, major protests erupted in Mexico over the rising costs of corn and tortillas.  In Pakistan, where wheat prices have jumped more than 20 percent since November, the government—fearing domestic food shortages—is cracking down on illegal grain exporters.

The hope, of course, is that soaring commodity prices will lead in a year or two to higher food production, but if the costs of farmland and fertilizers continue to rise, and drought conditions intensify, supply may not be able to keep up with rising global demand. Grain reserves could shrink and a genuine food crisis could be upon us.